Extended Computation: Wide Computationalism in Reverse by Smart, Paul et al.














Arguments for extended cognition and the extended mind are typ-
ically directed at human-centred forms of cognitive extension—
forms of cognitive extension in which the cognitive/mental states
and processes of a given human individual are subject to a form
of extended or wide realization. The same is true of debates and
discussions pertaining to the possibility of Web-extended minds
and Internet-based forms of cognitive extension. In this case, the
focus of attention concerns the extent to which the informational
and technological elements of the online environment form part of
the machinery of the (individual) human mind. In this paper, we
direct attention to a somewhat different form of cognitive extension.
In particular, we suggest that the Web allows human individuals
to be incorporated into the computational/cognitive routines of
online systems. These forms of computational/cognitive extension
highlight the potential of the Web and Internet to support bidirec-
tional forms of computational/cognitive incorporation. The analysis
of such bidirectional forms of incorporation broadens the scope
of philosophical debates in this area, with potentially important
implications for our understanding of the foundational notions of
extended cognition and the extended mind.
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Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science has
appealed to the idea that human mental states and processes may
be subject to a form of wide realization—a form of realization in
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which the mechanisms responsible for certain cognitive phenom-
ena extend beyond the biological borders of the individual to which
those phenomena are ascribed. This sort of idea lies at the heart of
recent philosophical work pertaining to the notions of extended
cognition and the extended mind [1, 2]. According to the hypoth-
esis of extended cognition, for example, human cognitive states
and processes are, on occasion, realized by mechanisms whose con-
stituents include material elements that lie beyond the borders of
the thing (the human individual) to which those cognitive states
and processes are ascribed. In this case, the appeal to wide real-
ization is made with regard to the sorts of phenomena that are
the explanatory targets of contemporary cognitive science (e.g.,
extended memory, extended perception, extended problem-solving,
and so on). This contrasts with the sorts of phenomena that animate
discussions pertaining to the extended mind. In this case, the target
phenomena include the mentalistic constructs invoked as part of
folk psychological explanations of human behaviour. According to
Clark and Chalmers [2], for example, extra-organismic resources,
such as a paper-based notebook, can, on occasion, form part of the
mechanistic supervenience base that sustains states of dispositional
belief. In this case, a dispositional belief is ascribed to a particular
human individual, but the physical mechanisms responsible for the
manifest occurrence of that belief (i.e., the mechanisms responsible
for the production of behaviour that warrants the ascription of the
belief) are ones that include resources drawn from the individual’s
extra-organismic environment.
Over the past decade, there have been a number of attempts
to apply these sorts of ideas to the Web and Internet. In terms
of our own research, we have sought to examine the extent to
which the informational and technological elements of the online
environment might be incorporated into human cognitive processes
[10, 11]. A central feature of this work relates to the nature of human
interactions and exchanges with the online environment. When it
comes to claims about the Web-extended mind, for example, we
have suggested that online information must be suitably poised to
shape human thought and action in a manner that is consistent
with the folk psychological role of belief states in the explanation
and prediction of human behaviour. In more recent work, we have
sought to apply this idea to the realm of extended knowledge. In
particular, we have sought to develop Web-based applications that
speak to the practical effort to engineer extended cognitive and
epistemic systems [12].
One of the insights to emerge from this interdisciplinary effort—
which straddles both philosophy and Web science—relates to the
status of both the online and offline environments as a source of
building materials for the construction of extended computational
and cognitive circuits. The best way of understanding this idea is
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via the notion of wide computationalism [4, 13]. Wide computation-
alism seeks to sever the link between individualism and computa-
tional psychology by drawing attention to the wide [9] or extended
[1] mechanisms that support cognitive–computational processes.
This idea, it should be clear, is one that is easily accommodated by
claims about the extended nature of human cognizing. Indeed, the
only substantive difference between wide computationalism and
extended cognition relates to the computational character of the
cognitive phenomena (e.g., cognitive processes) that are realized
by an extended nexus of material elements: The proponent of wide
computationalism insists that human cognitive states and processes
can be understood as bona fide computational phenomena, while
the proponent of extended cognition remains largely uncommitted
to this claim about the computational nature of the human cognitive
system.
For present purposes, we will assume that human cognitive pro-
cesses can be cast as computational processes and can thus be
understood from a broadly computational perspective. The upshot
is that when we consider the possibility of Web-based forms of cog-
nitive extension, we are encouraged to think about our interactions
and engagements with the Web and Internet (the online environ-
ment) in computational terms. That is to say, the processes that
sustain episodes of (Web-based) extended cognizing will qualify as
computational processes, and the informational and technological
elements of the online environment will serve as the material el-
ements of computational mechanisms that (in part) serve as the
(wide) realization base for these processes. From the standpoint of
wide computationalism, then, a case ofWeb-extended cognizingwill
qualify as a form of extended computation. Extended computation
is, in short, the computational counterpart to extended cognition.
It refers to a state-of-affairs in which a computational capacity is
ascribed to a particular entity (in this case, a human individual), but
the mechanisms that support the run-time realization of the pro-
cesses reflecting the exercise of that capacity are ones that extend
beyond the bounds of the entity to which the computational capac-
ity is ascribed. (In the case of the Web and Internet, the processes
reflecting the exercise of the computational capacity are ones that
reach out to include the informational and technological elements
of the online environment.)
At this point, we are in a position to establish a link between
work in the philosophy of mind and computer science. In partic-
ular, we suggest that the notion of extended computation is one
that is readily applicable to work on human computation systems
[5, 8]. A human computation system is a computational system
that is partially constituted by the activities of one or more hu-
man individuals. That is to say, a human computation system is a
system in which one or more human individuals are incorporated
into the computational processing loops that would otherwise be
implemented by a purely technological system (e.g., a conventional
digital computer).1
What we see here is an effective reversal of the relationship
between some extended entity (the entity that is subject to some
form of extension) and the resources that are incorporated into
the extended circuits that realize the manifest occurrence of the
1In fact, research in this area is not limited to the incorporation of human individuals: a
variety of other animal species have been incorporated into computational processing
loops [6].
capacities (and other dispositional properties) that are ascribed to
that entity. From a philosophical and cognitive scientific standpoint,
the focus of our attention is the human individual (qua extended
entity), and it is thus the elements of the extra-organismic envi-
ronment (including the online environment) that we see as being
the candidate elements for computational/cognitive incorporation.
Relative to work on human computation systems, however, these
roles are reversed. Now the focus of our attention is the online
computational/technological system (qua extended entity) and it
is the material elements of the offline (real-world) environment
(e.g., human individuals) that are the material building blocks of
extended computational circuits.
The upshot is that the appeal to extended computation high-
lights the bidirectional nature of the opportunities for computa-
tional/cognitive extension that are afforded by the Web and Inter-
net. Relative to debates in the philosophy of mind and cognitive
science, the human individual is the primary focus of our attention
when it comes to a consideration of the potential for computa-
tional/cognitive extension, and it is thus the human individual that
serves as what we might call the incorporating resource or ex-
tended entity—i.e., the entity that incorporates online resources
into their computational/cognitive routines. This changes once we
move beyond the browser interface and look at matters from the
other side of the screen, so to speak. In this case, our attention shifts
to consider the computational/cognitive capacities of the techno-
logical systems that inhabit the online world. Here, the human
individual is not so much the incorporating resource as they are the
incorporated resource—a resource that is incorporated into the com-
putational/cognitive routines of an online system. What we have,
then, is a distinction between two forms of computational/cognitive
extension:When the human individual is subject to some form of ex-
tension, we have a case of human-centred computational/cognitive
extension, while, from the technological standpoint, we have a case
of machine-centred computational/cognitive extension.
As with human-centred forms of computational/cognitive exten-
sion, machine-centred forms of computational/cognitive extension
raise a host of issues and concerns. Some of these concerns relate
to the ethical implications of incorporating human individuals into
extended processing loops. From a machine-centred perspective,
human individuals emerge as the material fodder for the implemen-
tation of extended computational/cognitive circuits, and the role
of the human individual is to service the computational/cognitive
interests of the machine that incorporates them (just as our own
human cognitive interests are served by the incorporation of ma-
terial artefacts into our own cognitive processing routines). This
raises a worry that is reminiscent of that expressed by social and
political theorists of a bygone era. In respect of the Industrial Era,
for example, Karl Marx remarked that “In handicrafts and manu-
facture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the machine
makes use of him” [7, p. 548]. Our current philosophical preoc-
cupation with human-centred forms of computational/cognitive
extension is commensurate with Marx’s views of human labour
beyond the factory walls, for it is here that we see the incorporation
of extra-organismic resources as a means of extending the reach of
our human cognitive and epistemic horizons. The reversal of this
relationship speaks to Marx’s fears about the forms of exploitation
and control that accompany the transition to life within the factory
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walls. For, in this case, the human individual is, according to Marx,
relegated to the status of a mere component that serves the inter-
ests of the larger system (both mechanical and socio-economic) of
which they are a part. In the context of debates about extended
cognition and the extended mind, it is the elements of the external,
extra-organismic world that become part of the machinery of the
human mind. But, with the advent of the Web and Internet, we
confront a somewhat more unnerving form of incorporation—a
form of incorporation in which the human mind functions as a
mere cog in a much larger computational/cognitive machine.
Setting aside the social and ethical concerns, we suggest that
a consideration of human computation systems raises a number
of issues that are central to philosophical debates about extended
cognition and the extended mind. To help us see this, it is worth
noting that from a purely mechanistic standpoint there is little
to distinguish a case of human-centred computational/cognitive
extension from a case of machine-centred computational/cognitive
extension. Consider, for example, that the mechanisms underlying
these two distinct forms of extension are ones that may be con-
stituted by exactly the same components. From a human-centric
perspective, a case of Web-based computational/cognitive exten-
sion will involve a human individual interacting with resources
drawn from the online environment. But the same is true when
we look at Web-based computational/cognitive extension from a
machine-centric perspective. Once again, the mechanisms responsi-
ble for this particular form of extension will involve the interaction
between some online resource (e.g., a computer) and some offline
resource (e.g., a human individual). From a mechanistic standpoint,
then, these two forms of Web-based computational/cognitive exten-
sion look to be indistinguishable. This is important, for it suggests
that a mechanistic account of cognitive extension—one that appeals
to the nature of the mechanisms responsible for the realization of
extended computational/cognitive phenomena—is unlikely to be
adequate (by itself) as a theoretical account of extended cognition
and the extended mind.
A second issue relates to the distinction between distributed
computation/cognition and extended computation/cognition. The
term “distributed cognition” is typically invoked in the context of
socio-technical systems—-systems in which some form of cognitive
processing occurs as the result of interactions and exchanges be-
tween a combination of social (human) and technological elements
[see 3]. Given that this characterization is one that is readily appli-
cable to a human computation system—at least when such systems
are involved in the performance of a cognitive task—it is unclear
how we ought to distinguish between the notions of distributed
cognition and extended cognition. Are extended cognitive systems
a particular kind of distributed cognitive system? Or are distributed
cognitive systems a particular kind of extended cognitive system?
In addressing this issue, we suggest that we ought to direct at-
tention to the entity that is deemed to be the subject of extended
cognitive states and processes. A distinguishing feature of extended
cognitive systems, we suggest, is that some dispositional property
(e.g., a cognitive capacity, cognitive ability, or dispositional men-
tal state) is ascribed to an entity, but the manifest occurrence of
that property (e.g., the exercise of a cognitive ability) is one that
involves the instantiation of a process whose (mechanistic) realiza-
tion base includes elements that lie external to the entity to which
the dispositional property is ascribed. This provides us with a way
of distinguishing extended cognition from distributed cognition: In
the case of distributed cognition, the dispositional properties are
ascribed to the larger socio-technical system and the processes that
reflect the manifest occurrence of those properties are ones that
are realized by mechanisms whose constituents are confined to the
borders of the thing (i.e., the socio-technical system) to which the
dispositional properties are ascribed. This contrasts with the case of
extended cognition, where the dispositional properties are ascribed
to a single component of what (at run-time) amounts to a larger
materially-hybrid system. Accordingly, we suggest that distributed
cognition ought to be regarded as distinct from extended cognition:
Distributed cognition is not a particular form of extended cognition,
but neither is extended cognition a form of distributed cognition.
The same applies, we suggest, to the notions of distributed com-
putation and extended computation. While it might seem appro-
priate to regard all human computation systems as engaged in dis-
tributed computation, we suggest that there is an important differ-
ence between distributed human computation systems and extended
human computation systems. Distributed human computation sys-
tems are systems in which a computationally-relevant dispositional
property is ascribed to a larger, socio-technically hybrid system.
This contrasts with extended human computation systems, where
the computationally-relevant dispositional properties are ascribed
to the technological (in this case, online) component of the larger
materially-hybrid (run-time) organization. From a machine-centric
perspective, then, we will observe a case of extended computa-
tion whenever 1) we ascribe a computational capacity to an online
technological system and 2) the exercise of this capacity is one
that involves the instantiation of a computational process that in-
cludes resources (e.g., human individuals) that lie external to the
technological system. The same will be true when we move from
machine-centric forms of extended computation to machine-centric
forms of extended cognition. In this case, the relevant capacity will
be one that qualifies as a cognitive capacity, but this shift in the
nature of the dispositional property will not affect the way we
think about the extended status of that capacity. In both cases, the
appeal to an extended capacity (regardless of whether this capacity
is one that is cognitive or computational in nature) will be tied
to the instantiation of a process whose realization base includes
resources that lie external to the technological system to which the
dispositional property is ascribed.
There is, no doubt, much more that could be written about these
issues. For present purposes, however, we have sought to show that
the philosophical preoccupation withWeb-based forms of cognitive
extension ought not to be limited to the idea that the online envi-
ronment serves as a potential target for cognitive incorporation. By
directing our attention to the notion of extended computation and
the possibility for bidirectional forms of computational/cognitive in-
corporation, we are introduced to the possibility of machine-centric
forms of computational/cognitive extension—forms of extension
in which one or more human individuals are incorporated into the
information processing loops of an online (technological) system. A
consideration of such systems presents us with a bewildering array
of social, ethical, and engineering concerns. From a philosophical
perspective, however, the most important consideration is likely
to be the way these peculiar forms of cognitive extension (which
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have emerged in the wake of the Web and Internet) introduce us
to issues and concerns that might otherwise have been overlooked
should our philosophical focus have remained firmly fixed on the
traditional human targets of research into extended cognition and
the extended mind.
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